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We study the complexity of lattice problems in a world where algorithms, reductions, and protocols can run in superpolynomial time, revisiting four foundational results: two worst-case to average-case reductions and two protocols. We also show a novel protocol. 1. We prove that secret-key cryptography exists if O˜(n‾√)-approximate SVP is hard for 2εn-time algorithms. I.e., we extend to our setting (Micciancio and Regev's improved version of) Ajtai's celebrated polynomial-time worst-case to average-case reduction from O˜(n)-approximate SVP to SIS. 2. We prove that public-key cryptography exists if O˜(n)-approximate SVP is hard for 2εn-time algorithms. This extends to our setting Regev's celebrated polynomial-time worst-case to average-case reduction from O˜(n1.5)-approximate SVP to LWE. In fact, Regev's reduction is quantum, but ours is classical, generalizing Peikert's polynomial-time classical reduction from O˜(n2)-approximate SVP. 3. We show a 2εn-time coAM protocol for O(1)-approximate CVP, generalizing the celebrated polynomial-time protocol for O(n/logn‾‾‾‾‾‾‾√)-CVP due to Goldreich and Goldwasser. These results show complexity-theoretic barriers to extending the recent line of fine-grained hardness results for CVP and SVP to larger approximation factors. (This result also extends to arbitrary norms.) 4. We show a 2εn-time co-non-deterministic protocol for O(logn‾‾‾‾‾√)-approximate SVP, generalizing the (also celebrated!) polynomial-time protocol for O(n‾√)-CVP due to Aharonov and Regev. 5. We give a novel coMA protocol for O(1)-approximate CVP with a 2εn-time verifier. All of the results described above are special cases of more general theorems that achieve time-approximation factor tradeoffs.